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More competences than you knew? The web of health competences for Union action in 
response to the COVID-19 outbreak 
Working Paper 
submitted to European Journal of Risk Regulation 
Kai P Purnhagen, Mark L Flear, Tamara K Hervey, Alexia Herwig, Anniek de Ruijter 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (Union) response to COVID-19 has been viewed as underwhelming. 
Observers are puzzled as to why a threat that seems so similar in severity is evoking such a 
variety of responses from Union Member States. Further, there is widespread public criticism 
of the Union for apparently failing to support its own Member States where, for instance, China, 
Russia and Cuba have done so.1 By early April 2020, calls for the Union to undertake debt 
mutualisation - so-FDOOHG ³FRURQDERQGV´ - to help pay for recovery had grown stronger, 
threateniQJWKH8QLRQ¶VYHU\IXWXUH2  
The spectrum of potential measures taken at Union level is wide. Disaster response regulation 
regularly comprises: risk assessment, advance planning and mitigation, concrete emergency 
measures and recovery. Our main focus in this short article is on concrete emergency measures, 
although we also touch on recovery: a fuller analysis would involve more space than available 
here.3 
To combat COVID-XQOLNHLWV0HPEHU6WDWHVWKH8QLRQPD\DFW³RQO\ZLWKLQWKHOLPLWVRI
the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives 
VHWRXWWKHUHLQ´4 As lawyers, we understand why one may think that the Union has no power 
to act in ways that public health experts, and others, such as economists and behavioural 
SV\FKRORJLVWV VXJJHVW ZRXOG EH KHOSIXO 7KH 8QLRQ¶V SRZHUV LQ WKH KHDOWK GRPDLQ DUH
                                               
1
 https://euobserver.com/opinion/147841?utm_source=euobs&utm_medium=email, accessed 24 March 2020. 
2
 0LNH-RKQVRQ6DP)OHPLQJ*X\&KD]DQµ&RURQDYLUXV,V(XURSHORVLQJ,WDO\"¶Financial Times (London, 6 
April 2020) https://www.ft.com/content/f21cf708-759e-11ea-ad98-044200cb277f, accessed 6 April 2020. 
3
 See Kai P Purnhagen, Anniek de Ruijter, Mark L Flear, Tamara K. Hervey, Alexia Herwigµ0RUH
&RPSHWHQFHV7KDQ<RX.QHZ¶ZRUNLQSURJUHVV6HHUHODWHGO\$QQLHNGH5XLMWHUEU Health Law and 
Policy: The Expansion of EU Power in Public Health and Health Care 283$QQLHNGH5XLMWHUµ0L[LQJ
EU Security and Public Health in the Health 7KUHDWV'HFLVLRQ¶LQ$QQLHNGH5XLMWHUDQG0DULD:HLPHUHGV
EU Risk Regulation, Expert and Executive Power (Hart 2017); Mark L Flear, Governing Public Health: EU 
Law, Regulation and Biopolitics (Hart 2015; 2018); Tamara K Hervey and Jean V McHale, European Union 
Health Law: Themes and Implications (CUP 2015); Tamara K Hervey and Jean V McHale, Health Law and the 
European Union (CUP 2004). 
4
 Art. 5 (2) sentence 1 TEU. 
traditionally understood to be severely constrained: health law and policy is seen as a matter 
for Member States. 
We propose an alternative to this standard legal analysis. The Union has more possible legal 
powers to create health law and policy in response to the COVID-19 outbreak than traditionally 
understood, particularly if the different iterations of the protection and promotion of public and 
human health throughout the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) are read in relation 
to RQHDQRWKHU7KLVDOWHUQDWLYH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI WKH8QLRQ¶VFRPSHWHQFHQRUPV WKH³OHJDO
EDVHV´RQZKLFKWKH8QLRQLQVWLWXWLRQVDFWHLWKHUWRDGRSWELQGLQJOHJDOUXOHVRUSHUVuasive 
measures, suggests that there are legal options that permit the Union a wider range of actions 
than it has taken to date, and which support, and go further than, the approaches that the 
European Commission (Commission) and European Centre for Disease Control have suggested 
in various policy documents, guidance and communications in March and April 2020.5 In short, 
we are arguing that legal impediments to Union action are less restrictive than commonly 
understood. 
II. SPECIFIC COMPETENCE NORMS: THE LEGAL BASES FOR UNION LAW 
AND POLICY ON COVID-19 
1. Encourage, support, coordinate, resource 
The Union enjoys significant powers to encourage, support and coordinate cooperation 
between the Member States in the area of public health, in general,6 and in the context of natural 
disasters.7 Specific competence norms support, for example, cooperation between Member 
States in cross-border healthcare,8 in bio-medical and other research,9 and in civil-protection.10 
The Union has already lawfully taken binding decisions which coordinate actions of the 
Member States in epidemiological surveillance, and has done so since the 1990s.11 The Union 
has power, for example, through coordination decisions taken within the Health Security 
                                               
5
 )RUGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHXVXDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH8QLRQ¶VFRPSHWHQFHQRUPVVHHHJ3DXO&UDLJµ(8
&RPSHWHQFHV¶LQ'HQQLV3DWWHUVRQDQG$QQD6RHGHUVRQHGVA Companion to European Union Law and 
International Law (Wiley-Blackwell 2016). 
6
 Art. 168 TFEU.  
7
 Art. 196 TFEU. 
8
 European Commission, Guidelines on EU Emergency Assistance on Cross-Border Cooperation in Healthcare 
related to the COVID-19 crisis COM(2020) 2153 OJ C111I/1, 3 April 2020.  
9
 Arts. 180 and 182 TFEU. 
10
 Art. 222 TFEU. 
11
 See, e.g., European Parliament and Council Decision (EC) 2119/98 setting up a network for the 
epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases in the Community OJ L 268/1; European 
Parliament and Council Decision (EU) 1082/2013 on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing 
Decision No 2119/98/EC OJ L 293/1.  
Committee,12 to encourage Member State cooperation in adopting passenger screening 
measures, requiring the temperature of passengers to be taken before boarding a flight.13 The 
Member States took coordinating measures of that nature as an intergovernmental act in 2009 
during the Swine flu epidemic. But now the formal recognition of the Health Security 
Committee in Union law suggests that such a coordinating decision could lawfully be taken as 
a Union act. 
The Union also enjoys significant powers to deploy its own (admittedly relatively limited) 
resources, for example through its structural funding.14 The Union has competence to fund 
collaborative research15 into vaccines, treatments, new medical equipment and devices; 
epidemiological research into the spread of COVID-19; behavioural research into effective 
disease containment strategies; and social science research into the social, economic, political, 
legal and cultural consequences of COVID-19. Since 2007, the Union has had competence, 
XQGHUWKH³VROLGDULW\FODXVH´16 if its Member States so desire,17 to pool resources under a Civil 
Protection Mechanism. Since March 2019, the Civil Protection Mechanism has been 
VWUHQJWKHQHGE\³UHVF(8´LQDQDWWHPSWWRFHQWUDOLVH8QLRQFDSDFLWLHV18 permitting the Union 
to use its internal funds, pre-committed national funds, and Union co-ILQDQFHG0HPEHU6WDWHV¶
capacities at the disposal of Union efforts, to respond to a major emergency. This gives Union 
competence, for instance, to organise a European medical corps and a distinctive COVID-19 
public procurement scheme.19 
                                               
12
 This Committee, although in existence as inter-governmental cooperation before this date, was established as 
a Union Committee by European Parliament and Council Decision 1082/2013 (EU) on serious cross-border 
threats to health OJ L 293/1, art 17. It is a formal Committee in the sense of European Parliament and Council 
Regulation (EU) 182/2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by 
0HPEHU6WDWHVRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VH[HUFLVHRILPSOHPHQWLQJSRZHUV2-/DQGWDNHVGHFLVLRQVLQ
DFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHµH[DPLQDWLRQSURFHGXUH¶XQGHUDUWRIWKDW5HJXODWLRQ 
13
 Such measures might require a dual legal basis of Art. 168 TFEU and Art. 80 (2) TFEU, the competence norm 
on which the European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 300/2008 on common rules in the field of civil 
aviation security OJ L 97/72 is based. 
14
 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, Regulation (EU) No 1301/2013 and Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 as 
regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the health care systems of the Member States and in other 
sectors of their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak [Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative] 
COM(2020) 113 final. 
15
 Arts. 180 and 182 TFEU. 
16
 Art. 222 TFEU. 
17
 Council Decision (EU) 2014/415 on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity 
clause OJ L 192/53. 
18
 European Parliament and Council Decision (EU) 2019/420 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism OJ L 
77I/1. 
19
 -RDQD0+DXVVLJHWDOµ7KH(XURSHDQ0HGLFDO&RUSV)LUVW3XEOLF+HDOWK7HDP0LVVLRQDQG)XWXUH
3HUVSHFWLYHV¶Eurosurveillance https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2017.22.37.30613; 
European Commission Press Release: EU Launches New European Medical Corps to Respond Faster to 
The Union also has power to permit Member States to deploy resources in response to COVID-
19 in ways which distort competition in the internal market,20 that is, by giving state aid to key 
industries.21 7KH&RPPLVVLRQKDVSURSRVHGGLVDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHQRUPDO³RQHWLPHODVWWLPH´
principle,22 and will permit national measures ensuring access to liquidity and finance; 
preserving employment;23 and, crucially, facilitating COVID-19-relevant research and 
development, supporting the construction and upgrade of testing facilities of COVID-19- 
relevant products, and expanding production capacity for products needed to respond to the 
outbreak.24  
2. The limits of Union harmonisation 
The Union does not have competence to adopt measures which have as their primary objective 
WKH³KDUPRQLVDWLRQ´RIQDWLRQDOGHILQLWLRQVRIKHDOWKSROLF\RUWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQDQGGHOLYHU\
of health services and medical care, including management of health services and medical care 
and the allocation of resources;25 or of national public health laws on tobacco or the abuse of 
alcohol.26 %XWWKHVHFRQVWUDLQWVRQ8QLRQFRPSHWHQFHGRQRWPHDQ³WKDWKDUPRQLVLQJPHDVXUHV
(...) FDQQRWKDYHDQ\LPSDFWRQWKHSURWHFWLRQRIKXPDQKHDOWK´27 The Union may lawfully 
adopt measures which have the effect of improving health, so long as those measures remove 
                                               
Emergencies (MEMO/16/276), para. 20; European Union Emergency Support Instrument for the healthcare 
sector - questions and answers 2 April 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_20_577, accessed 4 April 2020. 
20
 Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU; Art. 107 (2)(b) TFEU. European Commission Communication, Guidelines on State aid 
for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty (2014) OJ C 249/1. 
21
 European Commission Communication, Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the 
economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak, 20 March 2020, COM (2020) 1863 OJ C 91I/1; amended European 
Commission Communication, Amendment to the Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the 
economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak, 3 April 2020, COM (2020) 2215 final  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/sa_covid19_1st_amendment_temporary_framework_en.
pdf. 
22
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank and the Eurogroup, Coordinated economic response to 
the COVID-19 Outbreak, COM(2020) 112 final, 13 March 2020, Annex 3 p 6 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-annex-coordinated-economic-response-covid19-march-
2020_en.pdf. For example, a Brexit-preparedness measure for Ireland has been repurposed to help Irish firms 
cope with COVID-SURYLGLQJD¼PLOOLRQVXSSRUWVFKHPHIRUDFXWHOLTXLGLW\DQGUHVWUXFWXULQJQHHGVRI
SMEs. 
23
 By, for instance, deferring payment of taxes and social security contributions by industries which have been 
badly affected (e.g. travel and tourism). 
24
 For example, medicinal products (including vaccines) and treatments, their intermediates, active 
pharmaceutical ingredients and raw materials; medical devices, hospital and medical equipment (including 
ventilators and protective clothing and equipment as well as diagnostic tools); disinfectants and their 
intermediary products and raw chemical materials necessary for their production and data collection and 
processing tools). 
25
 Art. 114 TFEU; Art. 168 (7) TFEU. 
26
 Art. 114 TFEU; Art. 168 (5) TFEU. 
27
 Case C-376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
(Tobacco Advertising), EU:C:2000:544, para. 78. 
obstacles to trade or remove appreciable distortions of competition.28 Union internal market 
measures must protect and promote public health,29 and where new scientific evidence comes 
to light, the Union must update existing harmonised measures.30 Thus, the Union may, for 
example, amend its packaging laws, to contain COVID-19 spread through hard surfaces,31 and 
protect consumer health.32 The Union also has competence to protect the environment,33 and 
so could, for instance, adopt the WHO technical standards on water, sanitation, hygiene and 
waste management for COVID-1934 in Union law. 
The Union also has competence to delay35 and to relax harmonised standards from the point of 
view of individual human health, in order to protect population health. Such relaxation of 
standards would, for instance, assist in permitting the production of less highly specified 
personal protective equipment, which offers some, though less, protection against transmission 
of COVID-19; or the production of ventilators with three tubes, rather than one. The Union is 
competent to promote mutual recognition across the internal market of fast-track qualifications 
of medical professionals, introduced by several Member States in response to COVID-19,36 
and to reduce the minimum time required to qualify in a medical specialism.37 This Union 
competence is consistent with Union internal market powers, not least because it leaves 
Member States more discretion to adopt higher domestic standards.  
3. 8QLRQ³LQFHQWLYHPHDVXUHV´ 
                                               
28
 Art. 114 TFEU; Case C-376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union (Tobacco Advertising), EU:C:2000:544. 
29
 Art. 114 (3) (4) TFEU. 
30
 Art. 114 (8) TFEU; Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco, ECLI:EU:C:2002:741, para. 76. 
31
 For example on the packaging of foods, European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 1935/2004 on 
materials and articles intended to come into contact with food and repealing, OJ L 338/4; and other measures of 
the hygiene package for foodstuffs, see for a summary the Commission website 
https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/biosafety/food_hygiene/legislation_en. 
32
 Arts. 169 and 114 TFEU. 
33
 Arts. 191 (1) and 192 TFEU. 
34
 WHO team, Department of Communications, Water, sanitation, hygiene and waste management for COVID-
19 - Technical brief (19 March 2020), available at  
https://www.who.int/publications-detail/water-sanitation-hygiene-and-waste-management-for-covid-19. 
35
 The European Commission has proposed the delaying of the entry into force of by one year the European 
Parliament and Council Regulation on medical devices (EU) 2017/745 OJ L 117/1 from taking effect due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The Directive is planned to take effect on 26 May 2020. The proposal aims to ensure the 
µVPRRWKIXQFWLRQLQJRIWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHW¶DVLJQLficant level of protection of public health and patient safety, 
provide legal certainty and avoid market disruption, see Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/745 on medical devices as regards the dates of application of 
certain of its provisions COM(2020) 144 final. 
36
 Arts. 53(1) and 114 TFEU. 
37
 European Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 2005/36 on the recognition of professional qualifications OJ 
L 255/22, Art. 25 (5), Annex V. 
7KHH[WHQWRIWKH8QLRQ¶VSRZHUVWRDGRSWELQGLQJPHDVXUHVZKLFKincentivise 0HPEHU6WDWHV¶
DFWLRQV ³WRSURWHFW DQG LPSURYHKXPDQKHDOWK DQG LQSDUWLFXODU WR combat the major cross-
ERUGHUKHDOWKVFRXUJHV´38 LVXQWHVWHG³,QFHQWLYLVDWLRQ´PXVWPHDQVRPHWKLQJIDOOLQJVKRUWRI
OHJDOO\PDQGDWLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHFRPSOLDQFHZLWKD³KDUPRQLVHG´QRUP%XWEH\RQGWKDWLWV
meaning is unclear. 
7R³LQFHQWLYLVH´PHDQVWRRIIHU a benefit for or impose a detriment from a particular action: 
LQFHQWLYLVDWLRQFDQ LQYROYH³FDUURWVRUVWLFNV´3RVLWLYH LQFHQWLYHVDYDLODEOH WR WKH8QLRQ WR
offer to its Member States include access to resources, such as Union funding; collectively held 
or secured equipment, human resource, pooled expertise or knowledge, administrative 
capacity, or information;39 DQGWKH8QLRQ¶VJHR-political capital. Negative incentives include 
exclusion from those resources, and also fines or other sanctions adopted against Member 
States. 
Incentive measures could be combined with binding Union coordinating measures, to enhance 
national compliance. The Union might thus be empowered to reinforce measures that are 
already required by secondary Union law, such as reporting thrRXJKWKH8QLRQ¶V(DUO\:DUQLQJ
and Response System, including sharing personal data necessary for contact tracing.40 Going 
further, Union law could provide positive incentives to Member States which, for example, 
impose temporary travel bans; or even those Member States which mandate curfews at the first 
outbreak sites. Incentives could, for instance, involve access to more Union resources for those 
Member States which reach certain targets of disease control and containment of COVID-19, 
encouraging Member SWDWHVIRUH[DPSOHWRLPSRVHVWULFWTXDUDQWLQHPHDVXUHV7KH8QLRQ¶V
basis for action is stronger in the case of Union measures, like these, that seek to prevent the 
                                               
38
 Art. 168 (5) TFEU. 
39
 For example, 0HPEHU6WDWHV¶FRPSHWHQWDXWKRULWLHVDQGKHDOWKFDUHSURIHVVLRQDOVKDYHDFFHVVWRWKH&29,'-
19 CMSS (Clinical Management Support System) in order to ensure a quick exchange of knowledge and 
experience between clinicians from across the EU and EEA on how to manage patients with severe COVID-19. 
Any clinician working in a hospital treating complex COVID-19 can have access to the Web Conferencing 
system and be supported by a dedicated Helpdesk. See Guidelines on EU Emergency Assistance on Cross-
Border Cooperation in Healthcare related to the COVID-19 crisis COM (2020) 111, 3 April 2020, para. 8. Or 
WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶V$UWLILFLDO,QWHOOLJHQFH5RERWLFVUHSRVLWRU\IRUVKDULQJ$,5RERWLFVVROXWLRQVWR&RYLG-
19, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/join-ai-robotics-vs-covid-19-initiative-european-ai-
alliance. 
40
 European Parliament and Council Decision (EU) 1082/2013 on serious cross-border threats to health OJ L 
293/1; Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/253 laying down procedures for the notification of alerts 
as part of the early warning and response system established in relation to serious cross-border threats to health 
and for the information exchange, consultation and coordination of responses to such threats pursuant to 
Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council OJ L 37/23. 
outbreak of a communicable disease becoming a cross-border problem; or reduce the cross-
border nature of a serious health threat like COVID-19. 
In adopting incentive measures, the Union must respect national responsibilities for health 
services and medical care.41 Measures that would incentivise Member States to adopt particular 
kinds of treatments or to increase the number of intensive care units or doctors are outside 
Union competence. Nonetheless, taking into account general principles of Union law, such as 
WKHSUHFDXWLRQDU\SULQFLSOHWKHSURSRUWLRQDOLW\SULQFLSOHDQGHVSHFLDOO\WKH8QLRQ¶V Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, Article 35, on the right to health care, we might consider the possibility 
of Union competence to incentivise Member States to provide localised, temporary, ad-hoc and 
context-specific solutions to concrete cross-border problems with regard to health services that 
arise when fighting threats to public health, such as COVID-19. The Union perhaps has 
competence to adopt measures that, for example, provide resources to health service providers 
working together on COVID-19 responses across an internal Union border where existing 
health corridors already involve sharing resources.42  
Even where there is no direct cross border element, for example in the case of school closures 
or curfews, the Union might have competence to incentivise these national measures where 
there is a serious health threat. Here we note the European &RXUWRI-XVWLFH¶V((&-¶V) approach 
WRLQWHUSUHWLQJD³FURVVERUGHU´HOHPHQWLQLQWHUQDOPDUNHWODZHYHQDSRWHQWLDOHIIHFWRQWKH
ability of factors of production (including people) to cross borders is enough to bring the matter 
within the scope of Union law.43  
)LQDOO\DQGPRVWDPELWLRXVO\LIZHFRQVLGHUWKDWD³EDFNVWRS´RI8QLRQPHDVXUHVWKDWDSSO\
LQWKHDEVHQFHRI0HPEHU6WDWHDFWLRQZRXOG³LQFHQWLYLVH´0HPEHU6WDWHVWRDFWWKH8QLRQ
would have competence to adopt a very wide set of measures indeed. In the absence of domestic 
measures to coordinate, the Union might - on an untested interpretation of the relevant 
competence norm - have the power to adopt binding risk-based, local and temporary measures 
to contain the spread of COVID-19 that apply in the absence of domestic action. This approach 
                                               
41
 Which would be prohibited by Art. 168 (7) TFEU. 
42
 Such as the long-standing cross-border health initiatives between France and Spain in the Cerdagne region, or 
in the border region between Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary; or Luxembourg Lorraine 
Santé, in the border region between France, Belgium and Luxembourg. These types of incentive measures are 
envisaged by the European Commission Guidelines on EU Emergency Assistance on Cross-Border Cooperation 
in Healthcare related to the COVID-19 crisis COM(2020) 2153 OJ C111I/1, 3 April 2020. 
43
 See, for example Case 8/74 Dassonville ECLI:EU:C:1974:82 µGLUHFWRULQGLUHFWDFWXDORUSRWHQWLDO¶&DVH&-
60/00 Carpenter ECLI:EU:C:2002:434 where the potential effect on cross border service provision was enough. 
VNDWHV YHU\ FORVH WR ³KDUPRQLVDWLRQ´ KHQFH ZRXOG RQO\ MXVWLI\ WHPSRUDU\ DQG ORFDOLVHG
mandatory Union acts. 
III. 7+(³:(%2)&203(7(1&(´025(7+$17+(6802),763$576 
The analysis above shows competence norms on which Union COVID-19 responses could be 
EDVHGDUHVSUHDGWKURXJKRXWWKH8QLRQ¶VHQDEOLQJ7UHDWLHV%XWZKDWLILQVWHDGRIWUHDWLQJHDFK
competence norm as a thread, or even tightrope, upon which the Union must carefully balance 
in order to take action, we looked at all of the threads together? Taken together, we argue, the 
Union Treaties provide a web of competence, which is stronger than its individual threads, and 
as such extends its legal powers beyond those of the separate threads of the discrete competence 
norms.  
This web of competence is based on the following aspects of the Treaties, which together 
provide the basis for interpreting its competence norms, placing the individual competences or 
threads in relation to one another, and allowing them to be woven into the web. Protection of 
human health is a general principle or value inherent in Union law, which takes precedence 
over mere economic considerations.44 7KH8QLRQLVREOLJHGWR³PDLQVWUHDP´KXPDQKHDOWKLQ
all its policies and activities.45 It has a residual power,46 where no specific competence norm is 
present, where necessary to achieve its objectives: this was the basis for Union health law and 
policy before 1993.47 7H[WXDO GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ ³KXPDQ KHDOWK´ ³SXEOLF KHDOWK´ ZKLFK
appear to distinguish types of Union competence (harmonisation, incentivisation, 
coordination), do not do so on closer inspection.48  
2EMHFWLRQVWRWKHLGHDWKDWWKH7UHDWLHVHPERG\D³ZHERIFRPSHWHQFH´JUHDWHUWKDQWKHVXP
of its separate parts, go to questions of legitimacy of the Union as a non-state entity that 
nonetheless takes decisions on behalf of its people(s). These are well-rehearsed in the literature, 
DQG ZH FDQQRW UHVROYH WKHP KHUH %XW ZH QRWH WKDW WKH 8QLRQ LV IDU IURP D ³FRPSOHWH´
democracy, and that constitutional-type limitations on its powers are even more necessary than 
limits on the governments aQGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQVRIVWDWHV,QSXWWLQJIRUZDUGWKHLGHDRID³ZHE
RI FRPSHWHQFH´ ZH GR QRW PHDQ WR DUJXH WKDW WKH 8QLRQ KDV unlimited or extra-textual 
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competences. Rather, we propose that the enabling texts of the Treaties be considered as a 
whole. In some ways, this approach constrains the Union as much, if not more, than an 
interpretation that treats the separate competence norms individually. 
,IDFFHSWHGWKH7)(8¶VZHERIFRPSHWHQFHVZRXOGSURYLGHDOHJDOEDVLVIRUDZLGHUUDQJHRI
acts to combat COVID-19 than those discussed so far. 
For example, the Union would have competence to keep borders open to essential products, in 
order to protect health.49 ,IQHHGHGWKH8QLRQ¶VKHDOWKFRPSHWHQFHV50 could be used as a legal 
basis to put pressure for compliance on Member States through incentive measures (sanctions 
or limiting access to data and EU protection mechanisms such as the EWRS). This inverts the 
traditional legal approach, that health protection is an exception to the rule of free movement, 
and thus Member States may derogate from internal market rules,51 where necessary to protect 
public health. It is the Member States, on this interpretation, who can control or interrupt supply 
chains in the internal market, for example to prevent export of medical equipment, devices or 
medicines necessary to combat COVID-19, and vital supplies such as food. The Union 
institutions only have the power to check for the proportionality of the measures, focusing on 
the domestic level. Member States can show that measures meet what is required by reference 
to the specific needs of their populations.52 
7KHZHERIFRPSHWHQFHVXJJHVWVDGLIIHUHQWDSSURDFKWRWKH8QLRQ¶VFRPSHWHQFHWRFRQWURO
national measures on the basis of proportionality.53 This approach is based on the principle of 
solidarity between Member States,54 WKH8QLRQ¶VREOLJDWLRQWRSURWHFWSXEOLFKHDOWK55 and the 
right to health care within Union law.56 On this approach, scarce products needed for 
combatting COVID-QHHGWREH³FKDQQHOHGWRWKRVHZKRQHHGWKHPPRVW´57 and this means 
keeping internal Union borders open for the supply of essential products, especially food, as 
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well as medical equipment, devices, and medicines. The internal market is at the service of the 
health of (XURSH¶Vpopulation. This is a novel interpretation of internal market law, not based 
on case law or any other legal instrument. It assumes a concept of Union public health and 
Union solidarity, rather than the usual interpretation where public health is a policy area in 
which domestic solidarity within 0HPEHU6WDWHVDQG0HPEHU6WDWHV¶VRYHUHLJQW\LQWKHKHDOWK
domain) is the principle that has to be traded-off against market integration. 
According to the Commission, this novel interpretation of proportionality means an outright 
export ban on essential products will not be deemed proportionate.58 National measures need 
to be aimed at ensuring that the products reach the persons who need them most considered 
at a Union level, and they need to suit the objective of protecting the health of people (again, 
at a Union level) who need them most. This is not the usual interpretation of Article 35 TFEU 
on export bans, or Article 36 TFEU, which was never intended to serve public health at Union 
level. But it is an approach that recognises the deeply integrated nature of the single market 
in goods, and the drastic effects that abrupt closure of complex supply chains would have, at 
DWLPHZKHQWKH8QLRQ¶VSRSXODWLRQVDUHDOUHDG\DWULVN59 The web of competence suggests 
that the Union institutions are empowered to take such decisions on this basis, preventing 
LQGLYLGXDO0HPEHU6WDWHVIURPKRDUGLQJFHUWDLQSURGXFWVRUOLPLWLQJWKHLUVXSSOLHUV¶DFFHVV
to the European market. 
Further, the web of competence would extend Union power over movement of people within 
and into the Union. Again, the power to restrain free movement of people, inter alia on public 
health grounds, is traditionally seen as reserved to the Member States.60 This division of 
powers suggests that the Union has no competence to act in response to COVID-19 by unified 
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movement, such as price regulation in Member States, as long as these are not discriminatory, are allowed 
according to the Commission COM(2020) 112 final, supra, note 22, Annex 2, p 5. As are other national 
measures to regulate the market of medical supplies. 
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and mandatory restrictions on free movement of people, for example, by screening 
passengers at airports and refusing permission to travel, monitoriQJLQGLYLGXDOV¶PRYHPHQWV
by tracking mobile phone data, or closing internal Union borders to people. For Union 
countries in the Schengen Area, in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code,61 Member 
States retain the power to check internal borders where public security is at issue,62 and to 
temporarily, and even immediately,63 reintroduce internal border controls where necessary 
EHFDXVHRIDVHULRXVWKUHDW WR³SXEOLFSROLF\RU LQWHUQDOVHFXULW\´64 LQFOXGLQJ³FRQWDJLRXV
GLVHDVH´65 The Council has power to recommend (but not mandate) such a reintroduction of 
internal border control.66  
But, again, the web of competence would give the Union a basis to go further than 
recommending, as the Commission has already done,67 checks on people crossing internal 
borders.68 It would allow the Union to mandate such checks, and to harmonise the conditions 
under which they are carried out.69 
Taking matters even further by adopting a very innovative reading, the web of health 
competence could potentially even allow the Union to reinWHUSUHWWKH³QR-EDLORXWFODXVH´70 
LILWFRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGDVSDUWRIWKH8QLRQ¶VKHDOWKpowers (within a web of competence) 
in emergency circumstances, which would potentially open the way to the proposed 
³FRURQDERQGV´DSSURDFKWR8QLRQSRVW-COVID economic recovery. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
7DNHQDVDZKROHWKH8QLRQ¶VFRPSHWHQFHVWRUHVSRQGWR&29,'-19 are wide-ranging: much 
more so than traditional legal analysis suggests. The Union has powers that permit more actions 
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than it has taken to date. Union competences, properly understood, support many of the actions 
the Commission has proposed and executed, and PRUH7KH8QLRQ¶VFRPSHWHQFHVDOVRFRPH
with implicit responsibilities: if the Union has power to respond to COVID-19, its citizens 
might legitimately expect it to do so. Further, with the responsibility to act come the implied 
means to take action: responsibility without enabling power and means (including funding) is 
meaningless. The web of competences is a legal basis to leverage that enabling power.  The 
legal limitations on Union action are not the issue. Questions as to which actions to take, and 
whether there is political or policy desire to take them, we leave to politicians, assisted by 
advisors such as virologists, behavioural psychologists, economists and epidemiologists. 
 
